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Abstract
It is briefly demonstrated that Gisin’s so-called ‘locality’ assumption
[in http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.4255] is in fact equivalent to the existence
of a local deterministic model. Thus, despite Gisin’s suggestions to the
contrary, ‘local realism’ in the sense of Bell is built into his argument
from the very beginning. His ‘locality’ assumption may more appropri-
ately be labelled ‘separability’. It is further noted that the increasingly
popular term ‘quantum nonlocality’ is not only misleading, but tends to
obscure the important distinction between no-signalling and separability.
In particular, ‘local non-realism’ remains firmly in place as a hard op-
tion for interpreting Bell inequality violations. Other options are briefly
speculated on.
1 Introduction
Gisin has recently concluded that “all violations of Bell’s inequality should be
interpreted as a demonstration of nonlocality” [1]. However, his definition of
‘locality’ is in fact equivalent to the existence of a local realistic model (in the
original sense of Bell [2]), as is shown in section 2 below. Hence, his refutation
of a role for realism - “an alleged alternative between nonrealism and nonlocality
is annoying” [1] - is not logically sustainable.
It is therefore suggested in section 3 that Gisin’s ‘locality’ assumption would
be better labelled as ‘separability’. For similar reasons, it is further suggested
that use of the misleading term ‘quantum nonlocality’, which is becoming popu-
lar in the literature, be avoided, as it implicitly suggests there is, as a matter of
fact, some mysterious faster-than-light influence operating in quantum systems.
While the possibility of such an influence cannot be denied, there is no physical
basis at present for its assertion as a consequence of measurable Bell-inequality
violations. Indeed, as noted in section 4, the principle of Occam’s razor suggests
the opposite, since the standard Hilbert space model of quantum correlations is
local but not realistic.
Some definitions are suggested in section 4 to clarify debates concerning
locality and realism in quantum mechanics, and some brief speculations are
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made in closing as to the nature of the distinction between no-signalling and
separability.
2 Equivalence of Gisin’s ‘locality’ with local re-
alism
Gisin identifies ‘locality’ as the assumption that the correlations measured by
two observers can be modelled by joint probabilities of the form [1]
p(a, b|x, y) =
∫
dλ ρ(λ) p(a|x, λ) p(b|y, λ), (1)
where a and b label respective measurement results for detector arrangements x
and y, and λ is some variable describing the physical state (eg, a quantum state,
possibly supplemented by ‘hidden variables’), with corresponding probability
density ρ(λ).
Now, a local deterministic model may be defined as one for which the quan-
tities p(a|x, λ) and p(b|y, λ) in equation (1) are restricted to take the values 0
and 1. Such models are also commonly called local realistic models, following
Bell’s original terminology [2]. However, while it might initially appear that
models satisfying equation (1) form a broader class of models than the class of
local realistic models, the difference is purely cosmetic. In particular, one has
the following result:
Theorem: For any set of measurement pairs {(x, y)}, there exists a model
satisfying equation (1) if and only if there exists a local realistic model.
Proof: Suppose first one has a model satisfying equation (1). Choose some
ordering of the possible results, {aj}, for each measurement (eg, for Stern-
Gerlach measurements on spin-1/2 particles, one could take the natural ordering
{ spin aligned with magnetic field, spin anti-aligned with magnetic field}). Now
define a corresponding local deterministic model via (i) the variable
λ˜ ≡ (λ, α, β),
where α and β are uniformly and independently distributed over the interval
[0, 1); (ii) the corresponding probability density
ρ˜(λ˜) = ρ˜(λ, α, β) := ρ(λ),
for λ˜; and (iii) deterministic probabilities
p(aj |x, λ˜) := 1 for α ∈

∑
i<j
p(ai|x, λ) ,
∑
i≤j
p(ai|x, λ)

 ,
p(bk|y, λ˜) := 1 for β ∈
[∑
i<k
p(bi|y, λ) ,
∑
i≤k
p(bi|y, λ)

 ,
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and equal to zero otherwise. It is trivial to check that, by construction, for any
pair of measurements x and y one then has
p(aj , bk|x, y) =
∫
dλ˜ ρ˜(λ˜) p(aj |x, λ˜) p(bk|y, λ˜).
Hence, there is a local realistic model as claimed. The converse is trivial (any
local realistic model satisfies equation (1) by definition), and the theorem is
proved. QED. ⋄
Since either model reproduces precisely the same observable joint probabili-
ties, p(aj , bk|x, y), it follows that any measurements of these probabilities per se,
eg, in Bell-inequality tests, cannot distinguish between the models. Hence, one
cannot claim that all local realistic models are experimentally refuted without
also claiming that all models satisfying equation (1) are refuted, and vice versa.
Equation (1) is thus both formally and empirically equivalent to ‘local realism’.
It might be argued, of course, that nature could in ‘reality’ be such that
equation (1) is satisfied, but with no variables such as α and β existing to
provide a deterministic model. However, while such an argument would allow
‘nonrealism’ to be maintained in the interpretation of equation (1), it would
do so via mere metaphysical assertion, with no testable physical consequences -
similar in spirit to discussing how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
The above theorem is a simple generalisation of existing results in the lit-
erature for single measurements [3, 4]. Note that the assumed ordering means
that the model is (locally) contextual [3, 4]. Fine has previously used a rather
different (nonlocally contextual) construction to obtain a form of the theorem
for the case of four measurement pairs [5], which can be generalised to the case
of a countable set of measurement pairs [6]. In contrast, the above theorem
applies to arbitrary sets of measurement pairs, such as spin measurements in all
possible directions.
It is concluded that Gisin’s puzzlement over “possible hiding places for re-
alism” [1], is easily resolved - it is hidden, right from the start, in his so-called
‘locality’ assumption (1) ! Clearly, this assumption has more to it than meets
the eye, and a more suitable label is required. This is considered below.
3 Let’s call a spade a spade
One sentiment of Gisin’s that I do strongly agree with is expressed in the first
paragraph of [1]: “why should one use the word[s] local realism rather than local
determinism?” The second term is, after all, far less loaded with metaphysical
luggage. The popularity of the first term, despite the vagueness of ‘realism’, is
due of course to its introduction by Bell in his famous paper [2] (no doubt as a
homage to the discussion of ‘elements of reality’ in the similarly famous paper
of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [7]).
However, as follows from the previous section, one must similarly ask “why
should equation (1) be labelled as ‘locality’, when it is certainly much more than
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this?”. In fact, historically, equation (1) has had many previous labels, a number
of them being more apposite.
For example, Gisin also refers to equation (1) as ‘conditional independence’,
and it has been previously been called ‘objective locality’ [8], ‘local explicability’
[9], the combination of ‘parameter independence’ (no-signalling) with ‘outcome
independence’ [10], and the combination of no-signalling with ‘classical logic’
[4].
In contrast, I would like promote an alternative term, ‘separability,’ for the
property corresponding to equation (1). Its usage dates back, at least, to dis-
cussions by d’Espagnat [11], and implicitly incorporates the notion that joint
correlations of this form can be decomposed or partitioned or ‘separated’, rel-
ative to the observers. The term is also, advantageously, a priori neutral with
respect to the concept of locality, and is satisfied by the measurement statistics
of all separable quantum states (although there are interesting subtleties as to
the precise distinction between equation (1) and so-called ‘quantum’ separability
[12]).
Summing equation (1) over a and b respectively, for arbitrary ρ(λ), it is seen
that ‘separability’ immediately implies the weaker property
p(a|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, λ) = p(a|x, y′, λ), p(b|x, y, λ) = p(b|y, λ) = p(b|x′, y, λ),
(2)
for the marginal probabilities. Thus, all locally measurable statistics for each
observer are independent of what measurement, if any, might be made by the
the other observer. This property is, these days, typically referred to as ‘no-
signalling’. For statistical models (where all observable quantities are deter-
mined by measurement statistics), it is clearly equivalent to the property that
the measurable properties of one system cannot be influenced by operations
carried out on the other system.
Thus, it is equation (2) that, far more appropriately in comparison to equa-
tion (1), can be labelled as ‘locality’. It is well known that quantum mechanics
is local in this sense, where λ labels the quantum state (proofs that quantum
mechanics satisfies no-signalling, for the general case of physical operations de-
scribed by linear maps on density operators, appear to have first been given in
[13] and [14]). Relativistic locality corresponds to the case where x and y are
measured in spacelike separated regions.
Finally, it should be noted that the popular term ‘quantum nonlocality’
carries a totally misleading connotation: that there is something happening
faster-than-light in quantum systems. Yet, as follows from section 2 above, and
discussed in greater detail elsewhere [15, 16, 17], there is in fact no physical
justification for such a connotation. While this term might sound good (and
look good on grant applications), this is only because it inherently carries an
unjustified suggestion of action at a distance (particularly to non-experts). Mer-
min concludes its use is no more than ‘fashion at a distance’ [15], and Zukowski
notes its appearance in the PACS classification 03.65Ud is not appropriate [16].
I submit that the label ‘quantum nonseparability’ would be far less loaded!
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4 Conclusions
Gisin is able to conclude in [1] that quantum mechanics is ‘nonlocal’, irrespective
of any consideration of realism, only because his definition of ‘locality’ is formally
and empirically equivalent to ‘local realism’, as far as Bell-type inequalities are
concerned. Hence, there are no consequences of his conclusion for debates on
locality vs realism - other than as to the question of how ‘locality’ might be
physically defined without implicitly assuming realism.
To clarify such debates, I would like to suggest that the following practices
be considered, for the reasons given in sections 2 and 3 above:
(i) ‘locality’ for statistical theories, when used in an unqualified sense, be
equated with ‘no-signalling’ as per equation (2);
(ii) the term ‘local realism’ be replaced by ‘local determinism’;
(iii) the property codified by equation (1) be labelled as ‘separability’; and
(iv) the misleading term ‘quantum nonlocality’ be replaced by ‘quantum non-
separability’.
Note that (i) and (iii) imply that the Hilbert space model of standard quan-
tum mechanics is both local and nonseparable. This model is also nonrealistic -
the statistics are nondeterministic (and generated via measures over q-numbers,
not c-numbers) - and hence provides an example of a local nonrealistic model of
quantum correlations (in contrast, eg, to ‘nonlocal realistic’ models [18]).
Considerations of simplicity, as per the principle of Occam’s razor, now
lead to a logically rather different possibility than ‘nonlocality’: given that no-
signalling is satisfied by quantum mechanics, why suppose there is some more
fundamental ‘signalling’ hidden variable theory? - which would, for example,
force one to worry about whether (and why) one can safely ignore what is hap-
pening in the Andromeda Galaxy when describing systems on Earth! If nature is
nonseparable and no-signalling, and quantum mechanics describes these aspects
accurately, why go beyond it?
The above argument emphasises that whatever property one might wish to
assume in addition to no-signalling, to obtain equation (1) - and no matter
whether this additional property is called ‘realism’, or ‘determinism’ or ‘expli-
cability’ or ‘outcome independence’ or ‘classical logic’ or ‘whatever’ - it is a
property that logically may be given up to explain violations of Bell inequali-
ties. In particular, there is no need to assume that anything ‘faster-than-light’
occurs in nature - although this, of course, remains an alternative possibility.
The distinction between ‘no-signalling’ and ‘separability’ is therefore an im-
portant topic of investigation in understanding quantum mechanics (assuming
this is possible!). It would be fascinating if some corresponding testable inequal-
ity could be found. Note that a further danger of the term ‘quantum nonlocality’
in this regard is that it tends to obscure this distinction - much as Bohr tried
to obscure the measurement problem by ignoring the problematic distinction
between classical and quantum systems.
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Finally, some (non-original) speculations on the nature of Bell-inequality
violations might be in order. Two possibilities are, of course, a fundamental in-
determinism (or ‘nonrealism’), and faster-than-light signalling. Another is that
the current model of spacetime as a simple causal manifold, which provides the
empirical justification for no-signalling, is inappropriate (however, it is is not
known, for example, how to describe fields without such a model). Yet another,
motivated by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [7], is ‘incompleteness’ (substan-
tially sharpened as the ‘outcome independence’ property of Jarrett [10]). Fi-
nally, Bohr’s reply to Einstein et al. [19], refusing to permit a physical reality to
be ascribed even to a property that could be predicted with probability unity
(the property had to actually be measured, via an experimental setup inher-
ently incompatible with other properties), suggests instead the possibility of a
fundamental epistemological limit.
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